Executive Summary

Relevance: The Islamic Republic of Iran has been a full member of the BRICS intergovernmental association since 2024, alongside the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of Indonesia. However, the new phase of BRICS development has been marked not only by the inclusion of new permanent members but also by the establishment of a new cooperation status — BRICS partner countries — which includes Belarus, Bolivia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan, all of which have confirmed their consent to acquire this status. Regarding Saudi Arabia’s status as a permanent member, no positive or negative response has been received; however, given BRICS’ interest in this country, its position is also included in this analytical work.

The ongoing military situation surrounding Iran, which has persisted for nearly a month (since 28 February 2026, following the statement by US President Donald Trump) due to US-Israeli actions, raises not only concern regarding the evident destabilisation of the region, public outcry, and condemnation, but also directly impacts both the trade-economic and energy sectors (particularly due to Iran’s partial blockade of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz) and may affect relations among BRICS members. Given the specific nature of the BRICS format — non-interference in the internal affairs of states, the absence of military-political cooperation or internal provisions on allied assistance to BRICS member states (unlike, for example, the North Atlantic Alliance, i.e., NATO) — the positions in this conflict and the statements of BRICS members may have implications for future bilateral cooperation and may cause tensions at future summits. Furthermore, this study excludes the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the country is the aggrieved party in the conflict.

Based on the stated relevance, the aim of this analytical report is to systematise and compare the official positions of BRICS member states and countries that have obtained BRICS partner status regarding the escalation of the US-Israeli conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Based on the stated aim, the object of study is the ongoing military conflict between the US-Israel and Iran, while the subject of study is the official positions of BRICS member states and countries that have obtained BRICS partner status regarding the escalation of the US-Israeli conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Methodology

The following tasks were set to achieve the aim:

1. Compile a database of official positions of permanent BRICS members and BRICS partner countries regarding the military confrontation between the US-Israeli side and Iran.

2. Systematise official positions according to a unified structure: date of statement, level of representation (head of state, minister, official spokesperson), key theses, and form of response (military action, mediation, etc.).

3. Establish criteria for comparative analysis of positions: level of condemnation of US and Israeli actions, stance on Iran’s right to self-defence, rhetoric regarding compliance with international law, calls for de-escalation, and practical steps (mediation, recall of ambassadors, positioning at the UN).

4. Conduct a comparative analysis of the positions of the identified groups of states (permanent BRICS members / partner countries) to identify similarities, differences, and main types of foreign policy response (support for Iran, balanced position, distancing, neutrality).

5. Group states by the nature of their official response and classify them according to the identified types of positions.

6. Present the results of systematisation and comparative analysis in a table format, containing for each country: status within BRICS, essence of the official position, key quotes or actions, and an assessment of the position on a given scale (e.g., from -2 to +2) for visual comparison.

In accordance with the stated aim and the aforementioned tasks, the chronological framework of this analytical report is limited to the period from February 2026 to 27 March 2026, as the active phase of the conflict has been unfolding during this period. Although Israeli military strikes on Iranian territory began as early as summer 2025, the official intervention of the United States in the Middle Eastern conflict has only exacerbated the situation.

The methodological framework of this analytical report comprises the following methods:

• Elements of the diachronic method — in this analytical report, elements of the diachronic method manifest through: established temporal constraints, the existing status of partnership between states and Iran, and the recording of status changes (expansion of membership) within BRICS. This method enables the documentation of how the escalating tension surrounding Iran is reflected in the positions of BRICS countries.

• Comparative analysis — within this report, it is intended to encompass both qualitative comparison of the content of statements and evaluative visualisation of differences.

• Analysis of foreign policy positioning — in this study, this type of analysis facilitates the examination of how states, through official statements, actions, and diplomatic steps, construct their image, define alliance priorities, and delineate the boundaries of solidarity in a specific conflict.

Results of the study. Based on the set tasks, it can be concluded that the aim of the analytical report has been achieved.

Analytical Report: Official Positions of BRICS Member States and BRICS Partner Countries on the US-Israeli Aggression Against Iran

Table 1: Positions of Permanent BRICS Members on the US-Israel vs Iran Conflict

Table 2: Positions of New BRICS Members on the US-Israel vs Iran Conflict

Table 3: Positions of BRICS Partner Countries on the US-Israel vs Iran Conflict

Table 4: Positions of Invited States (Not Yet Members) on the US-Israel vs Iran Conflict

Background to the Contemporary Conflict

Although the new military phase of the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Israel, with the support of the United States of America, began barely a month ago (28 February 2026, when US President Donald Trump issued a statement announcing the commencement of a military operation against the Islamic Republic of Iran), subversive actions and proxy wars between Iran and Israel have been driven by historical animosity towards one another. It is also worth noting that up until the 2020s, “relations between Iran and Israel […] underwent a complex path from propaganda, information, and sabotage wars, through proxy and cyber wars, to the hot war of 2025”.

Considering the mutual rejection by both states, this is also compounded by the Palestinian question. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not recognise Israel as a state, just as most Arab League countries do not, instead voicing support for the Palestinian state. Against this backdrop, the position of the United States of America, and the European majority, recognises the State of Israel in place of Palestine. In addition, relations between Iran and the US following the 1978-1979 revolution have been largely limited to sanctions pressure from the Western European hemisphere, and only during Donald Trump’s second presidency have relations between the states reached a critical phase.

Figure 1: Map of Israel-Palestine Recognition

The situation surrounding Iran has recently had implications not only for international security in the Middle East but also for the BRICS intergovernmental association, as Iran became a permanent member of BRICS in 2024. Based on the reaction of association members to the ongoing conflict and their official statements, which shape the further positioning of states on the world stage, these positions may affect future summits and communication within BRICS. The analysis of country positions regarding US-Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a permanent BRICS member, will lay the foundational “cornerstones” for the future development of the association.

Position Assessment Scale

• +2 = readiness to mediate in the conflict

• +1 = condemnation of US actions (without mediation)

• 0 = neutral position

• -1 = support for the US and Israel

• -2 = readiness to intervene in the conflict on the US side

Limitations of the study: Several states have not issued statements regarding the US-Israel conflict with Iran, and there is generally limited coverage of positions for countries such as Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, and Nigeria.

Detailed Analysis: Positions of Permanent BRICS Members

Federative Republic of Brazil

In 2023, the Federative Republic of Brazil and Iran celebrated the 120th anniversary of diplomatic and trade relations. To date, the two states have deepened cooperation at the level of partnership in the energy and agro-industrial sectors; however, the expansion of sectoral cooperation does not indicate friendly relations. Furthermore, Iran and Brazil have not concluded a strategic partnership agreement, but regularly hold meetings at the ministerial level, heads of parliamentary committees, and foreign ministries to discuss long-term cooperation agreements.

Currently, the BRICS format is the only platform on which Tehran and Brasília are building cooperation. Iran’s accession as a permanent member of BRICS was perceived negatively by Brazil, not so much due to Iran itself, but rather due to the phenomenon of expansion and Brazil’s fear of being overshadowed by new members (Venezuela was planned for inclusion).

Brazil’s position regarding the Israeli military attacks on Iran was already condemned in June 2025, for which reason the US joining this confrontation received similar condemnation of both sides (US-Israel) showing aggression towards Tehran:

“The attacks occurred against the backdrop of negotiations between the parties, which is the only viable path to peace, a position that Brazil traditionally defends in the region” — stated by the Government of Brazil.

In this conflict, Brazil’s position clearly demonstrates disagreement with US-Israeli actions, calling for a return to a peaceful resolution of contradictions, while not fully taking Iran’s side, given Iran’s retaliatory aggressive actions against Gulf states. Consequently, Brazil’s position is assessed as +0.5.

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran can be described as international “brothers in misfortune.” Both states face sanctions pressure from Western states and their allies, forcing the governments of Russia and Iran to pursue firm and structured national policies, as well as to seek new vectors for overcoming international isolation, expressed in particular in Russia’s support for Iran’s future accession to the permanent membership of BRICS.

Although the first Treaty on Mutual Relations between the parties was signed in 2001, a historic step between Russia and Iran was the conclusion in early January 2025 of the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and Iran,” which will not only allow the countries to deepen the existing level of cooperation in various spheres but also to share experience of development under the transformation of the international order, as Iran’s experience and the nature of sanctions against it until 2014 were among the most indicative, until the number of sanctions packages and international isolation of Russia following the commencement of the Special Military Operation in February 2022 surpassed those of Iran.

Shared views on the necessity of reforming the existing world order, calls for moving away from Western hegemonic politics towards multilateralism and multipolarity, and adherence to the UN Charter. Against this backdrop, the joint US-Israeli military actions against Iran received strong condemnation from the Russian Federation:

“The intentions of the aggressors are clear and are declared by them quite openly — to destroy the constitutional order and eliminate the leadership of a state they dislike, which has refused to submit to coercive diktat and hegemonism”

In this conflict, Russia’s position clearly demonstrates disagreement with US-Israeli actions, characterising these states as instigators of the conflict, thereby fully taking Iran’s side. Consequently, Russia’s position is assessed as +1, given the appeal for a peaceful settlement in accordance with the UN Charter, though Russia does not intend to act as a mediator in the conflict or send a military contingent in support of Iran.

Republic of India

Relations between Iran and the Republic of India have a strong historical background, but to date there is no official document between the states that would represent any particular status, limited to the expansion of bilateral contacts. Key areas of cooperation include: the development of Chabahar Port, the International North-South Transport Corridor, and other economic projects. Additionally, platforms for dialogue include meetings within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and, since 2024, within the BRICS framework.

The foundation of relations between Iran and India is the joint Chabahar Port project, located in the Gulf of Oman. The existence of this project is a key and large-scale infrastructure project, enabling the creation of a transport corridor bypassing Pakistan and providing access to the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as India’s own response to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.”

The Indian government perceives the military situation around Iran primarily as a threat to its trade and economic sphere, not excluding fears of an energy crisis in the country. This thesis is confirmed by N. Modi’s statement during a phone conversation with M. Pezeshkian:

“[We] condemned attacks on critical infrastructure facilities in the region, which threaten regional stability and disrupt global supply chains. We confirmed the importance of protecting freedom of navigation and ensuring that sea lanes remain open and safe”

In this conflict, India demonstrates a neutral attitude towards both sides of the conflict, towards both US-Israeli actions and Iran’s retaliatory responses. The state is more concerned about the situation around the Strait of Hormuz and the partial blockade of shipping. Thus, demands for the cessation of hostilities are linked to the desire to restore a key sea route for international trade. Consequently, India’s position is assessed as 0, neutral.

People’s Republic of China

On 27 March 2021, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi signed the Iran-China strategic agreement in Tehran, officially titled the “Comprehensive Programme of Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China.” This document is often referred to as the “Iran-China Strategic Pact”. China, as one of the initiators of BRICS expansion, specifically supported Iran’s full membership and expressed readiness to develop cooperation between the countries.

The danger for China lies not in a direct shortage of resources, but in disorder. The weakening of the United States is quite manageable; more dangerous is the situation when the country becomes unpredictable, brutal, and unconstrained by the system it once defended. A declining United States may create opportunities; an unstable America destroys the very conditions that allow these opportunities to materialise. Beijing fears not the loss of Washington’s power, but that it will use its remaining power in a way that complicates global governance. Faced with an increasingly reckless Washington, Chinese leadership will act cautiously, protect its vulnerabilities, and resist assuming global responsibilities for which it is ill-prepared.

“China expresses serious concern over the US and Israeli military strikes on Iran,” the statement reads. “China calls for an immediate cessation of the military operation”

In this conflict, China’s position condemns both sides of the military actions, while characterising US-Israeli actions as instigators and shaping the image of Iran as a clear threat to Middle Eastern stability. The Chinese side is concerned about the situation around the Strait of Hormuz and the partial blockade of shipping. Consequently, China’s position is assessed as +1.

Republic of South Africa

Over the past three decades, relations have deepened through mechanisms such as the South Africa-Iran Joint Commission for Cooperation (JCC), as well as political, economic, and technical dialogues. Iran and South Africa have signed over 90 agreements, memoranda of understanding, and joint statements in the areas of politics, economics, trade, culture, healthcare, sports, science, and social welfare.

Iran pursues a policy of diversifying external relations and in its agenda pays special attention to interaction with Global South countries. Therefore, Africa is an arena for rethinking its geopolitical position in the new world order. In recent years, Tehran has highly appreciated South Africa’s friendly political position, particularly its facilitation and acceleration of Iran’s accession to BRICS, South Africa’s position in defending Palestine, and its filing of a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. President Pezeshkian also pays more attention to economic relations and trade cooperation between the two countries, emphasising the importance of strengthening Iran-South Africa relations in the bilateral sphere, as well as international cooperation, including in the BRICS format.

It should be noted that the current US-Israel-Iran conflict has not been covered through official statements from South Africa; however, South Africa has expressed support for Iran during proxy clashes between Iran and Israel in the 2020s.

For this reason, South Africa’s position can be assessed as neutral (0; +0.5), leaning towards support for Iran, while calling for a general cessation of hostilities and a transition to peaceful dialogue between the parties.

Detailed Analysis: Positions of New BRICS Members

Arab Republic of Egypt

Against the backdrop of this general wave of establishing friendly relations, news emerged of potential warming of relations between Egypt and Iran, which had long been in a state of conflict due to a number of historical grievances dating back to the Shah’s era. Both states remain fundamentally divided on ideology and political systems, but share serious domestic socio-economic problems, prompting them to reduce tensions and discuss mutual benefits that could be secured by improved relations.

Iranian-Egyptian relations, despite all historical gaps, offer advantages for Gulf states. One of the main benefits of Cairo and Tehran’s rapprochement would be enhanced security in the Red Sea, which Iran could achieve by pressuring the Houthis to cease aggressive activity near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at its southern end.

For this reason, Egypt’s position can be assessed as favouring peaceful paths for conflict resolution. Given existing ties between Egypt and the US, the Egyptian government leans towards supporting Iran while calling for a general cessation of hostilities and a transition to peaceful dialogue between the parties. Egypt’s position assessment: +1 or +1.5 (in case of accepting the role of mediator in negotiations between conflicting parties).

United Arab Emirates

Relations between the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Iran can be characterised as a constant search for balance between territorial claims, security concerns, and national interests in the trade and economic sphere. The first half of 2026 demonstrates a sharp contrast between diplomatic dialogue and real escalation of tensions. On one hand, a high-level negotiation channel remains open: in March 2026, on the margins of the UN General Assembly session in New York, the foreign ministers of the two countries met, discussing the implementation of bilateral agreements and preparations for the UAE President’s visit to Iran. On the other hand, simultaneously, there was a sharp deterioration in relations in the political and economic spheres. In March 2026, the UAE cancelled the residence permits of all Iranian citizens, including “golden” visas, and seized Iranian assets worth approximately $530 billion.

The UAE leadership has come to terms with the fact that America’s “maximum pressure” during the Trump years could not protect the UAE from Iranian sabotage, terrorism, and treachery. Ultimately, Abu Dhabi is pursuing a hedging strategy aimed at protecting against Iran’s ability to subject Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to higher levels of instability and pressure. However, given the current US-Israel-Iran conflict, the UAE’s position largely supports the American-Israeli side due to the Emirates’ tensions over the development of terrorist lobbying groups and nuclear weapons development.

“We need a definitive outcome that will address the full spectrum of Iran’s threats: nuclear capabilities, missiles, drones, proxy terrorism, and blockades of international sea lanes”

In this conflict, the UAE shares US-Israeli views in perceiving Iran as a clear threat to Middle Eastern stability. The state is more concerned about the situation around the Strait of Hormuz, the partial blockade of shipping, and the possibility of gaining control over the strait. Consequently, the UAE’s position is assessed as -1.

Republic of Indonesia

Iran and Indonesia are developing multifaceted cooperation, which has intensified in recent years against the backdrop of the growing importance of the Asian vector in both countries’ foreign policies. Energy cooperation is a key area: the parties are implementing large-scale joint projects, including the construction of an oil refinery complex in Indonesia’s Banten province with a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day, in which Iran participates on a shared basis and provides raw material supplies.

In early 2026, bilateral relations faced a test concerning the situation around the Strait of Hormuz: two tankers belonging to Indonesia’s state-owned company Pertamina were blocked in the strait due to the military conflict between Iran, Israel, and the US. Indonesia conducted active negotiations with the Iranian side, and by the end of March 2026, Tehran gave a “positive signal” regarding the passage of vessels, while the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued coordination with Iranian authorities to resolve technical and operational details, including insurance coverage and crew readiness. This episode demonstrated the existence of a sustainable diplomatic channel between the two countries and the ability to resolve emerging problems through negotiations, confirming a high level of mutual trust.

No specific statements have been issued regarding support for either side of the US-Israel-Iran conflict; however, President Prabowo Subianto’s position indicates his readiness to travel to Tehran if Indonesia is appointed as a mediator in the US-Iran conflict.

In this conflict, Indonesia’s position is ambiguous: since Indonesia does not recognise Israel as a state (it recognises Palestine), it will not offer 100% support to the American-Israeli side, but Iran’s retaliatory military actions are recognised as a threat to international stability. The state is more concerned about the situation around the Strait of Hormuz, the partial blockade of shipping, and the potential threat to the country’s energy sector. Consequently, the author is inclined to suggest that Indonesia’s position is assessed as +1.5: in favour of peaceful discussions with the Tehran government and readiness to assume the role of mediator in resolving the conflict.

Detailed Analysis: Positions of BRICS Partner Countries

Republic of Belarus

“We, together with Iran, are full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Since 2025, we have begun participating in virtually all BRICS events as a partner of this intergovernmental association. The Eurasian Economic Union, with which Iran has signed an agreement, and since May 2025 a free trade zone has been functioning. Belarus is extremely interested in developing a free trade zone with Iran” — Sergey Anatolyevich Rachkov

Relations between Iran and Belarus in recent years have acquired a distinctly strategic character, based on a shared desire for independence from Western pressure and resistance to unilateral sanctions. Diplomatic relations between the countries were established on 18 March 1993, and since then interaction has consistently developed, reaching a new qualitative level in 2025-2026. In December 2025, the heads of the two countries’ foreign ministries signed three key documents that established a long-term framework for comprehensive cooperation: the Programme of Inter-Ministerial Cooperation for 2026-2030, as well as two declarations — on strengthening the role of international law in international relations and on guiding principles for countering unilateral coercive measures.

Friendly relations between the countries are also evident in the current conflict between the American-Israeli side and Iran. Statements by President Lukashenko:

“Israel’s treacherous attack with US support on Iran is unacceptable. This was stated by President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at a meeting with Iran’s Ambassador to Belarus Alireza Sanei”

In this conflict, Belarus’s position clearly demonstrates disagreement with US-Israeli actions, characterising these states as instigators of the conflict, thereby fully taking Iran’s side. Consequently, Belarus’s position is assessed as +1, given the appeal for a peaceful settlement in accordance with the UN Charter, though Belarus does not intend to act as a mediator in the conflict or send a military contingent in support of Iran.

Plurinational State of Bolivia

Iran and Bolivia are developing relations that can be characterised as a strategic alliance based on shared anti-imperialist positions and mutual support on the international stage. In March 2026, a significant event took place — the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission of Iran and Bolivia, held in Tehran under the auspices of Iran’s Ministry of Economy.

At the political level, Iran called on Bolivia to participate in shaping the new world order, while the Bolivian side characterised bilateral relations as “good and fraternal,” emphasising mutual support on human rights and anti-imperialism issues. Bolivia’s Vice President particularly noted Iran’s economic, scientific, and industrial potential, describing the maintenance of relations with Tehran as an advantage for his country. Meanwhile, according to Reuters, the US considers Bolivia an important base for Iranian diplomatic and intelligence operations in Latin America, taking advantage of the favourable atmosphere in a country with tense relations with Washington. The US administration has intensified its campaign against Iranian structures in the region, pressuring Bolivia to recognise Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organisations.

“The Plurinational State of Bolivia reaffirms its commitment to peace, the strengthening of democracy as a space where people fully realise their freedoms, and the unimpeded exercise of human rights, which must prevail under all circumstances”

In this conflict, Bolivia’s position demonstrates a neutral attitude towards both sides of the conflict, towards both US-Israeli actions and Iran’s retaliatory responses. However, Bolivia is more inclined to condemn the US-Israeli side for the initial strike on Tehran’s territories. Consequently, Bolivia’s position is assessed as +0.5, given that the state does not approve of any actions by the participants, does not intend to act as a mediator in the conflict or send a military contingent in support of Iran. The Bolivian side is only concerned with the fact of conflict resolution.

Republic of Cuba

Relations between the Republic of Cuba and Iran do not have the status of a strategic partnership; however, the countries pursue a diversified policy to expand areas of joint cooperation. For example, in 2023, representatives of Iran and Cuba signed seven memoranda of understanding and cooperation documents in various areas, including energy. An agreement was also reached to establish a joint working group on technological cooperation in the fields of nanotechnology and biotechnology. The Cuban ambassador noted that the parties are seeking to create conditions for Iranian companies to invest in Cuba’s oil and gas sector.

Given the similar conditions of tense relations between Cuba and the US, the position articulated by both Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“The attacks carried out on 28 February by Israel and the United States, violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, constitute a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter” — from Miguel Díaz-Canel’s social media — “The international community must take immediate measures to stop this aggression and escalation due to its unpredictable consequences”

In this conflict, Cuba’s position clearly demonstrates disagreement with US-Israeli actions against Iran. Consequently, Cuba’s position is assessed as +1, given that the state supports Iran as the aggrieved party in the conflict, but does not intend to act as a mediator or send a military contingent in support of Iran.

Republic of Kazakhstan

Iran and Kazakhstan maintain dynamic and multifaceted cooperation, which has recently reached the level of strategic interaction, reinforced by large-scale bilateral agreements. During high-level negotiations, the presidents of the two countries signed a joint statement and nine cooperation documents covering a wide range of areas. Special attention is paid to the development of transport and logistics infrastructure: memoranda on strategic cooperation in transport, transit, and logistics were signed, as well as a protocol on amendments to the agreement on international road transport. Key projects include the expansion of the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway route, as well as exploring prospects for opening new routes.

Despite the positive nature of relations, the conflict around Tehran is perceived as an internal contradiction between states, as reflected in statements by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“Kazakhstan has occupied, occupies, and will continue to occupy a position of non-interference in the affairs of other states. Therefore, in this case, we do not take anyone’s side. Neither Iran’s side nor the side of those countries that were subjected to attack”

In this conflict, Kazakhstan’s position is similar to that of the Republic of India, demonstrating a neutral attitude towards both sides of the conflict, towards both US-Israeli actions and Iran’s retaliatory responses. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s position is assessed as 0, given that the state does not approve of any actions by the participants, does not intend to act as a mediator in the conflict or send a military contingent in support of Iran. The Kazakh side is only concerned with the fact of conflict resolution.

State of Malaysia

Information on special agreements and relations between Iran and Malaysia is quite complex to ascertain. It is important to note that no special strategic partnership agreement has been recorded; however, the countries maintain friendly relations. In March 2026, the Iranian ambassador announced that Malaysian tankers are exempt from transit fees through the Strait of Hormuz — a decision motivated by friendly ties between the two countries.

In this conflict, Malaysia’s position clearly demonstrates disagreement with both US-Israeli actions and Iran’s retaliatory military actions. Consequently, Malaysia’s position is assessed as +0.5, given that the state does not approve of any actions by the participants, does not intend to act as a mediator in the conflict or send a military contingent in support of Iran, but supports Iran’s right to defend its sovereignty.

Kingdom of Thailand

The situation with the Kingdom of Thailand and Iran is largely similar to that of Malaysia — no special strategic partnership agreement has been recorded; however, the countries maintain friendly relations. A distinguishing feature of Thailand’s position lies in its close relations with the United States of America, but Thailand’s metaphorical description of diplomacy as “bamboo bending in the wind” — i.e., a combination of strength and flexibility — suggests a foreign policy that is both adaptable and pragmatic in its aim of ensuring national survival and independence.

In this conflict, Thailand’s position clearly demonstrates disagreement with both US-Israeli actions and Iran’s retaliatory military actions. Consequently, Thailand’s position is assessed as +0.5, given that the state does not approve of any actions by the participants, does not intend to act as a mediator in the conflict or send a military contingent in support of Iran, but supports Iran’s right to defend its sovereignty.

Republic of Uganda

Relations between Iran and Uganda, established several decades ago, received a powerful impetus for development after the first visit of an Iranian president to the African continent in 11 years. During President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Kampala in 2023, the leaders of the two countries confirmed their strategic orientation towards strengthening ties and signed four key memoranda of understanding. These agreements cover sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, animal health, and livestock, as well as mutual visa waiver. An important step was the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission, designed to serve as a platform for systematising cooperation.

In this conflict, Uganda’s position shows somewhat divergent views: the official policy of the Ugandan government (President Yoweri Museveni) and the public statements of the Chief of Army Staff, his son Muhuzi Kainerugaba, who is known for his provocative statements in support of US-Israeli actions. Consequently, the author is inclined to assess Uganda’s position as -1.5, because there are internal disagreements within the country, in particular the statement regarding readiness to provide military assistance to the US-Israeli side against Iran.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Despite the absence of an officially proclaimed strategic partnership status, both countries are actively working to expand the full spectrum of bilateral ties, building on previously reached agreements. The visit of the Vietnamese National Assembly Speaker to Tehran during the golden jubilee year of relations gave additional impetus to cooperation. The parties interact in the political, economic, trade, scientific, and cultural spheres. An important coordination mechanism is the Political Consultative Committee meeting, the eighth session of which was described by participants as “useful and fruitful.” Vietnam demonstrates determination to deepen ties, calling on its companies to develop cooperation with Iranian partners, while Iran emphasises the need to activate banking relations to facilitate economic interaction. The main focus is on implementing already signed agreements to achieve tangible results serving the interests of both countries.

“Vietnam expresses deep concern over the escalation and complex conflict situation in the Middle East, which seriously threatens the lives and safety of its people, as well as peace and stability in the region and the world”

Similar to the positions of Thailand and Malaysia, Vietnam condemns both sides of the conflict, but the state is more concerned about the situation around the Strait of Hormuz and the partial blockade of shipping. Thus, demands for the cessation of hostilities are linked to the desire to restore a key sea route for international trade. Consequently, Vietnam’s position is assessed as +0.5.

Detailed Analysis: Position of the Invited State

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Islamic Republic is interested in normalising relations. Severely affected by US economic sanctions, the resumption of ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states could help Tehran circumvent Washington’s financial warfare and other forms of pressure. Regarding the Palestinian issue, there is a clear divergence in approaches. While Iran supports Palestinian resistance movements, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and advocates armed resistance, Saudi Arabia has declared Hamas a terrorist organisation.

When Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations in March 2023, the rapprochement appeared fragile. The two regional powers set moderate public expectations for the pact, hoping it would at least help contain violence in Arab countries where both powers play a role and prevent the emergence of new wars. Despite long-standing antagonism, the parties managed to sign an agreement brokered by China, with preparatory work carried out by Iraq and Oman. It established a cold peace between the two long-time rivals.

Saudi Arabia recently approved the United States’ use of the King Fahd Air Base on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula. Before the US-Israel-Iran war began, Saudi Arabia stated that it would not allow the use of its infrastructure or airspace for attacks on Iran. However, Iran then began launching missile and drone strikes on key Saudi energy facilities and the capital Riyadh, which inevitably affected the shift in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s position.

“Prince Mohammed asserted that Iran represents a long-term threat to the Gulf states, which can only be eliminated by overthrowing the government”

Consequently, the author is inclined to assess Saudi Arabia’s position as -2, because Saudi leaders prefer the US to restore the regional balance of power that existed before 2003, when Iran was under severe sanctions and contained.

Conclusion

The analysis of official positions demonstrates a spectrum of responses among BRICS members and partner countries regarding the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, ranging from strong support for Iran (Russia, Belarus, Cuba) through balanced or neutral positions (Brazil, India, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Bolivia) to support for the US-Israeli side (UAE, Uganda, Saudi Arabia). The positions are influenced by a combination of factors: bilateral relations with Iran, historical ties, economic interests, security concerns, and strategic partnerships with the US. The conflict has revealed both the diversity of foreign policy orientations within the BRICS framework and the potential for tensions among members with divergent positions.