BRICS in Latin America: The bloc’s influence on the domestic politics and foreign policy choices of states in the region
Latin America can rightfully be considered one of the most significant regions in the history of BRICS for several reasons. First, the region’s most economically prominent player – Brazil – was one of the four founding states of this international grouping when it was established in 2009. Second, following the introduction of a special “BRICS partner country” status at the Kazan summit in October 2024, two other nations from the region – Bolivia and Cuba – were granted this status. Finally, throughout the 17-year history of BRICS, the question of expanding the bloc within the region – by incorporating other economically significant actors – has repeatedly gained relevance. At the same time, unlike other non-Western regions (such as Africa, the Middle East, or the Asia-Pacific), no further expansion of BRICS has taken place in Latin America to date; consequently, it remains the only region where the bloc is represented by just a single state. Understanding how the activities of BRICS influence the domestic and foreign policies of Latin American countries is essential for explaining both the region’s enduring interest in cooperating with the bloc and the reasons why the expansion process has currently stalled.
Brazil: opportunities and limitations regarding participation in the bloc
The Federative Republic of Brazil is the most economically significant player in the Latin American region. In addition to its substantial natural resource reserves and agricultural sector, Brazil possesses a well-developed industrial base – most notably in automotive manufacturing and the production of transport equipment – leading researchers to classify it, alongside Argentina and Mexico, as a “semi-industrialized” economy.
Given these factors, Brazil can be considered the most economically self-sufficient nation in Latin America, which enables it to pursue not only regional but also global initiatives and projects within the framework of BRICS. A prominent example in this context is Brazil’s active promotion of using national currencies for settlements among BRICS member states, aimed at reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar. Other significant examples of Brazil’s proactive role within BRICS include its initiatives concerning the environment and climate change: at the summit in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025, Brazil proposed the “Tropical Forests Forever Fund,” designed to preserve tropical forests globally. Furthermore, Brazil spearheaded the “BRICS Leaders’ Framework Convention on Climate Finance” and advocated for directing resources from the New Development Bank toward environmental projects. Another notable initiative is the “Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty,” through which Brazil seeks to scale up its successful domestic experience in combating poverty and inequality – specifically the “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger) and “Bolsa Família” programs, launched during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s first presidential term in the 2000s – to a global level.
At the same time, there are two primary limitations to Brazil’s participation in BRICS. First, the United States continues to exert significant influence on the Brazilian economy, remaining its second-largest trading partner (after China) – a group that also includes the Netherlands and Germany. Second, an important factor influencing Brazil’s activity within BRICS is the ideological orientation of the political forces in power. Brazil’s participation in the formation of the bloc coincided with the so-called “Latin American pink tide,” a period when left-wing forces came to power for extended terms in many countries across the region. In the 2010s, as energy prices fell and the economic situation in most of these nations deteriorated, the “pink tide” began to recede. Brazil was no exception; starting in 2016, the country began a gradual drift to the right – following the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, power passed first to the center-right figure Michel Temer, and later to the far-right politician Jair Bolsonaro. Although Brazil moved significantly closer to the United States and Israel during this period (2019–2023), the only tangible consequence of this “rightward turn” within the context of BRICS was a decline in Brazil’s previous level of initiative in launching international projects. Despite the elements of right-wing radicalism present in Bolsonaro’s public rhetoric – and, to some extent, in his domestic policy – Brazil’s trade partnerships with BRICS nations remained largely unaffected during his administration; in fact, toward the end of his term, the president even signaled a willingness to strengthen these commercial ties. With the return of Lula da Silva to power in 2023, Brazil’s engagement has resumed with renewed vigor (notably, the country’s environmental and climate initiatives date from 2023 to the present); furthermore, Lula’s victory in the 2026 general election – combined with the absence of any clear signs of political instability – suggests that these initiatives will continue to develop in a systematic manner at least until 2031. At the same time, despite active support from its traditional social base – poor and landless peasants, as well as those with leftist views – Lula da Silva’s party currently holds a rather fragile position within Brazilian society as a whole and needs to strengthen and expand its social base.
Argentina: reasons for declining to join BRICS and the shift in political course
After the initiative to expand BRICS, put forward by China at the 14th summit in 2022, as well as the end (as many believed then) of the “right turn” in Latin America, this region seemed to be one of the most promising in the context of the future expansion of the association. At the same time, economic difficulties associated with falling energy prices, which emerged in the early 2010s, persisted in most countries in the region, which left room for a new rise of right-wing forces and their radicalization due to populist rhetoric about the ineffectiveness of left-wing governments. This exact scenario was realized in Argentina, where in November 2023, Javier Miley, a non-systemic politician who positioned himself as an economically right-wing libertarian, won the presidential elections.
The Argentine Republic is one of the most economically significant players in Latin America. Along with Brazil, it also has a relatively developed automotive and chemical industry, and is also one of the regional leaders in terms of oil production. Argentina’s application to join BRICS was submitted in 2023 during the presidency of center-left Alberto Fernandez, but one of the first foreign policy decisions of the new administration, already in December of the same year, declined the invitation to join this application.
It should be noted that Javier Miley’s election campaign was marked by a number of high-profile statements on foreign policy issues, including borderline offensive rhetoric towards Brazilian President Lula da Silva, as well as an intention to sever trade relations with China to counter its “economic expansion” and complimentary statements towards the partially recognized Republic of China (Taiwan). A look at those events from today allows us to confidently state that most of such statements were nothing more than ordinary pre-election populism, since immediately after taking office, Miley’s rhetoric on most foreign policy issues became an order of magnitude softer. Thus, Brazil remained Argentina’s most important trading partner, and even the project of a common Brazilian-Argentine currency was not officially curtailed, although it has not received practical development over the past three years (it was envisioned that this common currency would be called “sur” and would be used for settlements in regional trade and financial transactions, with the aim of reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar and lowering operational costs, while maintaining the Brazilian real and the Argentine peso as national currencies.). The same applies to partnership with China, whose infrastructure projects in Argentina (for example, the joint construction of a multi-purpose port terminal on Tierra del Fuego) continue to be implemented, and contacts of Argentine diplomats with representatives of Taiwan (allegedly on the issue of diplomatic recognition of the republic) were decisively denied by the Miley administration. The initiative of the new president to dollarize the Argentine economy and a free trade zone with the United States did not receive development either – the regulatory framework of regional integration associations (primarily MERCOSUR) served as a limiting factor here, withdrawal from which could lead to catastrophic consequences for the Argentine economy. For this reason, the strengthening of US-Argentine cooperation is currently observed, for the most part, exclusively in the political and military spheres (for example, Argentina’s accession in March 2026 to Donald Trump’s Shield of the Americas initiative, aimed at combating international crime in the Americas).
At the same time, the change in government in Argentina has had its most pronounced impact on the country’s participation in transregional blocs, including BRICS. Unlike in the areas mentioned earlier, the Milei administration faces no trade or economic constraints here, allowing it to act based on its ideological preferences rather than pragmatic economic considerations. This has resulted in Argentina’s swift withdrawal from any involvement in BRICS. It should be noted that Javier Milei – in the vein of contemporary Latin American “non-establishment” right-wing figures – generally views economic integration blocs with skepticism, favoring bilateral partnerships instead. This is evidenced not only by his hostile rhetoric toward MERCOSUR but also by his clear lack of enthusiasm for the EU-MERCOSUR agreement (a factor that has contributed to the current stalling of that deal). That said, the Milei administration has shown a certain openness to bilateral cooperation with BRICS nations, extending beyond the purely economic sphere. For instance, while initially condemning Russia’s actions to defend the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, the Argentine leadership – following the rise of the Republicans to power in the United States – began to shift its rhetoric toward a more neutral stance. By 2025, it had even offered to act as a mediator in the Eastern European conflict, proposing Buenos Aires as a potential venue for negotiations.
Thus, while Argentina’s current political leadership demonstrates a willingness to engage in trade and economic partnerships with BRICS countries, its skepticism toward the bloc itself remains clear. From this, one can conclude that any involvement of Argentina in BRICS – whether as a member or a partner – should not be expected, at least until the 2027 presidential elections.
Mexico’s position on BRICS
As the undisputed economic leader in Central America and one of the three most economically significant players in Latin America as a whole (alongside Brazil and Argentina), Mexico was viewed as a potential new member of the BRICS bloc following China’s 2022 proposal to expand the group. This perception was largely driven by the traditional dominance of leftist, anti-imperialist forces in Mexican politics – a trend that intensified further after the 2018 rise to power of the leftist, anti-globalist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). In reality, however, these expectations did not materialize; unlike Argentina, Mexico never submitted an application to join BRICS. Furthermore, Mexico showed no interest in the “BRICS partner” status – a designation granted to Cuba and Bolivia in early 2025.
Despite his ideological alignment with the left, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador explicitly stated that North America remains the primary focus of Mexico’s foreign policy. This stance is partly explained by Mexico’s close cooperation with the United States and Canada under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA); participating in other economic blocs could complicate Mexico’s relations with its USMCA partners, inevitably leading to economic difficulties.
Equally significant is the security cooperation between Mexico and the United States – particularly in the context of the armed conflict that has persisted in Mexico since the mid-2000s against international criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking. Between 2007 and 2021 an agreement known as the Mérida Initiative was once in place between Mexico and the United States, aimed at jointly countering transnational organized crime. Cooperation in this sphere has been reinvigorated under the current president, Claudia Sheinbaum; in March 2026, Mexico – along with six other nations in Central America and the Caribbean – joined the “Shield of the Americas” project, which shares the same stated objective as the previous initiative.
Thus, unlike the countries of South America, Mexico’s stance on BRICS is shaped less by the ideological leanings of its leadership and more by its geographical location – which largely dictates its economic and political realities – as well as by domestic political instability. Currently, these factors preclude any participation by the country in BRICS.
The influence of BRICS on the domestic policy and foreign policy priorities of Latin American countries
An examination of Brazil’s 17-year experience within the BRICS grouping reveals that the primary impact of this participation on the country’s domestic policy has been an increase in funding for relevant environmental projects – an opportunity made possible by the New Development Bank. On one hand, given its geographical characteristics, this area has always been, and remains, of critical importance to Brazil. On the other hand, because BRICS currently functions as a purely economic association – lacking formal institutionalization or a binding regulatory framework – its influence on the state’s domestic policy priorities remains limited. This is evidenced by the fact that when right-wing forces came to power in Brazil, the country’s domestic policy underwent significant shifts, yet its participation in BRICS continued. In fact, the relationship may well run in the opposite direction: successful national-level programs aimed at combating poverty and hunger were subsequently reflected in Brazil’s international initiatives within the BRICS framework.
Regarding foreign policy, the influence of BRICS is notably more pronounced. This was most evident during the tenure of the right-wing administration, which, despite taking specific political steps to align more closely with the United States and Israel, simultaneously sought to maintain its ties with its BRICS partners. It is important, however, not to overstate the influence of the grouping itself; for instance, Argentina – which is not a member of BRICS – also maintained cooperation with China under its own right-wing leadership, driven by deep-seated trade and economic links that could not be severed without causing long-term damage to its economy. Furthermore, beyond its relationship with China, Brazil – during the Bolsonaro presidency – also sought to preserve friendly relations with Russia, even though Russia is not among Brazil’s key trading partners. This can be partly explained by Brazil’s participation in BRICS and the existence of joint projects with other member countries of the group.
Conclusions and prospects for cooperation in 2027–2030
An examination of the positions held by Latin America’s three most economically significant actors regarding BRICS reveals that the bloc’s standing in the region remains, at present, a complex and contradictory one. On one hand, Brazil – the region’s largest economy – was a founding member of BRICS; it has spearheaded several notable initiatives and projects within the group and has maintained a stable position that remains resilient despite shifts in the country’s domestic political landscape. On the other hand, the expansion of BRICS in the region is currently stagnant, with the underlying causes varying by country or subregion. In South America, this is largely driven by frequent and unpredictable changes in the political forces in power, compounded by persistent economic instability (as seen in the case of Argentina). In Central America – most notably in Mexico – the situation is shaped by the objective realities of geography: proximity to North America has led to deeper integration into the North American economy, alongside a pragmatic reliance on U.S. assistance to address the challenges and threats facing the subregion.
When forecasting the trajectory of BRICS in Latin America over the next four years, it is essential to consider that the rise of a new, non-establishment right-wing movement in Argentina has helped popularize similar ideas elsewhere in South America. Over the past two years, comparable political forces have secured electoral victories in Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia – whereas, during the same period, only in Uruguay have left-wing forces emerged triumphant. In light of this, two primary scenarios appear the most plausible. If right-wing forces maintain their standing in Latin American countries, the expansion of BRICS in the region is highly unlikely in the coming years, given the skepticism such political factions generally harbor toward economic integration blocs. At the same time, opportunities remain for individual BRICS nations to forge bilateral partnerships with these states; the likelihood of success for any given BRICS member is generally proportional to its economic footprint in the region (meaning China currently holds the greatest potential).
A second scenario envisions the current “rightward shift” fading away following the 2027 presidential elections in Argentina. In this case – while Chile and Colombia would likely remain out of reach for BRICS, at least until 2030 – it is quite possible that other nations could join the bloc’s activities, whether as full members or as partners.
It should also be noted that, under either scenario, the position of BRICS in Central America and the Caribbean could only strengthen if countries in that subregion perceive a possibility of receiving more effective assistance – from an alternative source – to combat their pressing threats than what they currently receive from the north (exceptions to this include Cuba and Nicaragua, which have maintained a steadfast anti-imperialist stance to this day).
Author – Rulyakov Sergey Sergeevich
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