The perception of China in the American press in the first half of the 20th century

Abstract: This article briefly analyzes the evolution of the image of China in the leading American press (The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Life, Time, and others) from the beginning of the 20th century until the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. The study identifies the key narratives and stereotypes that dominated American media discourse. The research demonstrates that the perception of China in the United States underwent a complex transformation: from the image of a profoundly backward yet exotic “Middle Kingdom” of the declining Qing dynasty, possessing promising economic potential, to a somewhat romanticized image of a victim of Japanese aggression and the status of an important yet problematic ally during the Second World War, which, as a result of the civil war, ultimately joined the communist camp in Eurasia. The study concludes that the formation of China’s image in the American press was closely linked to shifts in U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region, economic interests, and the political conjuncture of official Washington.

Keywords: USA, China, Sino-American relations, American press, media discourse, image of China.

Conflict of interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

For citation: Geht A.B. The perception of China in the American press in the first half of the 20th century.

Given the complex contemporary relationship between the United States and the PRC, examining the dynamics of how mutual perceptions are formed represents an important research task – one that has been insufficiently explored in the domestic academic community, particularly regarding how US-China relations are portrayed in the media. Whenever China has moved to the center of attention for the US political establishment – for whatever reason – topics related to China have immediately dominated the front pages of leading newspapers and magazines. This was the case in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when American business became captivated by trade prospects with the increasingly declining Qing Empire. In the 1930s, amidst Japanese aggression in the Far East, the American press was once again filled with coverage of the “China question.” The second phase of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), the founding of the PRC, and the Chinese people’s embarkation on the path of building socialism – all these events received extensive coverage and commentary in US print media, which continue to exert immense influence on public opinion in the leading nation of the Western world to this day.

It appears that factors of a traditional-historical nature exerted a definite – and indeed highly significant – influence on the formulation of official Washington’s policy toward China during the period under review; without considering these factors, the rather sharp fluctuations in American public opinion regarding China remain not fully comprehensible.

From the second third of the 19th century, China occupied a significant place in the activities of U.S. missionary organizations and was the target of considerable religious penetration by Americans. Political, academic, and religious circles within the young North American nation shared the conviction that the United States was destined to lift Qing China out of backwardness and poverty by introducing the Chinese to progressive ideas and laying the groundwork for a “democratic society” – as understood in the American sense – within the country. The prominent American Sinologist John Fairbank captured this sentiment with remarkable precision when reflecting on the nature of his compatriots’ activities in the “Middle Kingdom.”: “By the end of the century… we had found in the Chinese Empire – the “sick man of Asia” – the primary arena for our evangelical aspirations… This new and strange type of human society first aroused our curiosity, then our sympathy, yet it equally stirred up our greed and avarice. We began to apply methods developed at home to this society – methods that were expansionist and adventurist in nature. The American merchant in Shanghai spoke of the beneficial role of trade; the missionary, of salvation from the Fall. American expansion in China was not merely economic, religious, or nationalist; it was a combination of all these motives… China was invariably the weaker partner in our relationship – beset by troubles and in need of our sympathy and philanthropy. America, meanwhile, always played the role of the strong party, free from such difficulties and capable of extending aid. It was not a relationship between equals, and that, undoubtedly, is precisely why we found it so gratifying.”

Around the same time – the mid-19th century – the United States entered into rivalry with other expansionist powers in China, primarily Britain and France. As early as the 1850s and 1870s, Washington imposed a series of unequal treaties on the weakening Qing Empire; in the words of a contemporary U.S. official, these treaties intensified “Chinese antipathy and distrust toward all foreigners” and cast the United States as an “accomplice to the hostile actions” taken by European powers against China during the Opium Wars. Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy toward China also exhibited striking differences from that of Western European powers – nations that would scarcely have agreed to a pact with Beijing like the famous Burlingame Treaty of 1868.Under this treaty, China was formally recognized as an equal to the United States and granted the right to establish diplomatic missions and consulates on U.S. soil; it was accorded most-favored-nation status in trade, and Chinese subjects gained not only the opportunity to immigrate to the United States but also access to education – a matter of considerable importance for people hailing from a country with an ancient scholarly and educational tradition that had evolved along lines distinct from Western models.

By the end of the 19th century, the United States – having shifted from its earlier isolationist policy toward establishing spheres of influence on the global map – engaged even more vigorously in the struggle for hegemony in China. Official Washington advanced the so-called “Open Door” principle, which American imperialism viewed as a means to gradually displace competitors and secure decisive positions within the Qing Empire. While commercial interests played a significant role in guiding the United States, they were not the sole factor. As historian A. DeConde noted, Americans were – in this instance, as in other periods and arenas – driven by the concept of “Manifest Destiny”, which provided an ideological foundation rooted in the notion of “American exceptionalism” to justify their foreign policy actions. The expansionism and distinct aggressiveness of official Washington’s policy were presented to the American public through the lens of this emerging ideology of “exceptionalism”, thereby garnering broad public approval.

It is noteworthy that by the time the American public – and, above all, business and industrial circles – began to take a serious interest in China, a specific image of the country had already taken shape in the United States, fueling American expansionism toward China. Among the American political elite – largely under the influence of the British and other Western Europeans – China had acquired the reputation of an exotic land possessing a civilization that was highly developed yet utterly unlike anything known to European standards. A lack of concrete information about China fostered the spread of completely erroneous notions regarding the perfection of the Chinese political system, the “harmony within Chinese society”, and so forth.

American businessmen – followed by church figures who saw vast opportunities for missionary work – began appearing within the Qing Empire after the Opium Wars. Both groups quickly realized that the stereotypes about China prevalent in the U.S. did not match the country’s reality; they were struck by both its extreme social contrasts and its decaying state system. The difficulties Protestant missionaries faced in converting the Chinese to Christianity also contributed to a general disillusionment with China among the educated and privileged classes, while many ordinary Americans grew increasingly irritated by the large-scale migration of Chinese people to the United States. Nevertheless, shifts in the U.S. political elite’s attitude toward China had virtually no impact on the momentum of American expansion; economic interests – and, to a lesser extent, religious ones – continued to draw Americans to the Qing Empire.

However, as critical commentary regarding China’s internal affairs mounted in the United States, American attitudes toward the Chinese people underwent a transformation. At best, journalists portrayed China as a weak, backward nation inhabited by a people incapable of progress; more often, their attitude was even more blatantly cynical and racist. Hostility toward all things Chinese intensified particularly in the second half of the 19th century following the wave of mass immigration – exceeding 200,000 people in less than 15 years – triggered by the Burlingame Treaty of 1868. Sentiment was especially hostile toward Chinese laborers, or “coolies”, who immediately became targets of ridicule, abuse, and discrimination by the white American population, including in the press. Gradually, fueled by the “Yellow Peril” narrative – a concept concocted by journalists – Chinese people were barred from numerous trades and professions, and a significant portion of the Chinese diaspora was effectively forced into cramped ghettos in several major cities. In this way, the press fostered the spread of anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States during the latter half of the 19th century, ultimately influencing American authorities to enact the 1882 law banning immigration by Chinese nationals – a measure that was, in essence, blatantly racist.

The predominantly negative and contemptuous attitude toward the Chinese also shaped U.S. policy in China; by the early 20th century, this policy had become more cynical, harsh, and overtly imperialistic. Nevertheless, official Washington’s foreign policy also included other episodes – specifically those linked to the development of U.S. “soft power”. One of the most notable examples concerns the fate of the indemnities paid by the Chinese government to the United States for its role in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. Following the uprising’s suppression, China paid the U.S. approximately $24.5 million in silver – an amount that Beijing officials argued far exceeded the actual, verified losses suffered by American citizens and companies. Through negotiations, the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt agreed to return nearly half of the funds, stipulating that the money be used to educate Chinese students in the United States. The long-term goal was to foster a stratum of public figures in China who were educated according to the Western model and held a generally positive view of the United States. It is particularly worth noting that a portion of these funds was used in 1911 to establish the Tsinghua Preparatory College in Beijing; this institution later evolved into the renowned Tsinghua University.

Nevertheless, right up until the approach of World War II – with the exception of a brief period surrounding Sun Yat-sen’s direct tenure in power over part of China (which sparked keen interest in many publications, partly due to the potential fact that he held U.S. citizenship) – the American press generally maintained a rather skeptical attitude toward China, treating Chinese affairs as a clearly secondary topic. This largely superficial and skeptical outlook stemmed primarily from the fact that, by the late 1910s, China had effectively fractured into territories controlled by so-called “warlords” – various regional military dictators. Notably, assessments of China’s political situation in American publications tended to fall into two distinct categories: those concerning the policies of Chiang Kai-shek and those dealing with the activities of the “warlords”. Unsurprisingly, Chiang – one of Sun Yat-sen’s political successors – generally garnered positive commentary, with particular emphasis placed on the fact that both he and his family were practicing Christians. Conversely, the actions of the regional military dictators increasingly drew strong disapproval and criticism. For instance, the New York Times reported on the “precarious position of local governments”, “political chaos”, “numerous abuses by officials and military figures against foreigners in China”, and the role of warlords as the “primary cause of China’s problems.”

At the same time, the United States watched with great displeasure as Japan – having violated all treaty obligations regarding the “China question” – began gradually bringing China under its control, taking advantage of a global economic crisis that was monopolizing the attention of political circles in leading Western powers. Moreover, indignation at Japan’s aggressive actions emanated from a wide range of American circles; these groups remained convinced, as ever, that only Americans were the true “friends” of the Chinese people and that only they could bring China “good” and “liberation”.

These expansionist sentiments – framed within such a respectable concept combined with the commercial interests of American firms operating in the Far East, constantly influenced official Washington’s stance on the so-called “China question”, causing it to fluctuate sharply. Essentially, despite failing to respond to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 (even though The New York Times openly labeled China a “victim of Japanese militarism”) – and against the backdrop of a deepening, large-scale economic crisis – the United States demanded adherence to the “Open Door” policy in China as early as 1932. In 1933, dissatisfied with continued Japanese expansion and invoking the “Yellow Peril” narrative (echoing the anti-Chinese public campaigns of the late 19th century), the United States decided to accelerate naval shipbuilding in the Pacific. However, as Japan’s aggression toward the USSR intensified in 1935–1936, US foreign policy in the Pacific shifted toward a form of “appeasement” of Tokyo, achieved by making concessions to the Japanese regarding the “China question”.

Following the intensification of Japanese expansion in the Far East and the mounting tensions between the United States and Japan in the region, the U.S. approach toward China shifted once again. By the late 1930s, the prevailing view in socio-political discourse was that the United States had a moral obligation (and a moral right) to protect China – a nation seen as “poor” and “weak” yet “fighting the Japanese with burning hatred” – from aggression, and subsequently to lift it out of poverty and backwardness. Yet once again, as in the 19th century, these sentiments did not translate into concrete U.S. policy, which remained driven by other motives.

Against this backdrop, the book “Red Star Over China” by American journalist Edgar Snow – first published in 1937 and subsequently expanded and reissued in 1939 and 1944 – assumed particular significance. It was through this book that the broad American public not only gained a sweeping overview of the dramatic events unfolding in war-torn China but also, for the first time, became acquainted with the key figures of the country’s communist movement: Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, and Mao Zedong. Alongside material on the leaders of the Chinese communist movement, Snow presented American readers with analyses regarding the nature of Japanese foreign policy, the prospects for the collapse of the international balance-of-power system in the Far East, and the threats looming over Western European possessions in the Pacific region. Influenced by such publications, public sentiment in the U.S. gradually shifted toward sympathy for China and its people – victims of the numerous atrocities committed by Japanese militarists and clearly in need of American assistance: “…every day, Americans shudder at scenes of Japanese brutality as they shell and bomb Chinese towns and villages, and terrorize the populations of occupied Chinese territories”.

After the United States entered the war against Japan, this paternalistic approach colored Washington’s actions regarding China; a symbol of the shifting attitude toward China was Time magazine’s decision to name Chiang Kai-shek “Man of the Year” (1937). A similar phenomenon was the focus Life magazine placed on Chiang Kai-shek’s wife, Soong Mei-ling (better known in the U.S. as Madame Chiang) – who spoke fluent English and exerted tremendous effort to draw U.S. attention to events in China.

When considering the dynamics of American public opinion regarding events in China, it is essential to highlight the work of the renowned public figure, civic activist, writer, and translator Pearl S. Buck. A native-level speaker of Chinese, she not only translated the classic Chinese novel “Water Margin” (published in 1933) into English but also – drawing on her deep immersion in daily life in China – wrote novels rich in the exotic details and events that captivated American readers. After winning the prestigious Pulitzer Prize, she became the first American woman to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1938. Undoubtedly, her extensive public engagement and civic stance played a significant role in shaping the evolution of American public opinion regarding the dramatic events unfolding in East Asia.

During the war with Japan, the American press’s approach to China underwent a rapid and significant shift. First, the Chinese were U.S. allies, and the situation demanded that they be treated with greater respect. Second, one cannot overlook the public relations efforts of Soong Mei-ling (Madame Chiang Kai-shek), who worked to build and maintain a positive image for her husband. Third, a large group of journalists with liberal or moderate-left views worked in China as correspondents for various American publications during the war. As the outcome of the war with Japan became increasingly clear and the question of China’s future internal order moved to the forefront, these journalists frequently filed reports criticizing Chiang Kai-shek’s regime while speaking favorably of the Chinese Communist Party. In particular, segments of the American public were told that the Communists – who had grown significantly stronger – were more democratic, honest, and selfless than the Kuomintang, and were credited with building a disciplined and effective army. High praise was accorded to the nature of land reforms in the liberated areas and to the CCP’s efforts to ensure food supplies for the population. Dispatches from China noted that the Communists were forced to fight not only against the Japanese invaders but also against the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, who sought to destroy them. Notably, the American press once again featured work by Edgar Snow, who not only sympathized with the plight of the Chinese people but also held favorable views toward the Chinese Communist Party.

It is noteworthy that many American journalists – primarily those from the liberal political camp – frequently emphasized fundamental differences between the CCP and Soviet communists, describing the Chinese as essentially “agrarians” who “dreamed of creating a powerful, prosperous China friendly to the United States”. Against the backdrop of Kuomintang lawlessness and corruption, many in liberal circles viewed the CCP as a force that – through a program of gradual, evolutionary transformation of the Chinese countryside (a characterization they preferred over Mao Zedong’s actual utopian schemes) – would steer China toward “American-style democracy”. Such assessments by journalists covering the Far East fostered the illusion in the U.S. that, regardless of the outcome of China’s internal political struggle, the country would fall within the American sphere of influence in the Pacific; this contributed to a generally benevolent or neutral attitude toward the CCP within the United States. For instance, in the mid-1940s, The New York Times repeatedly urged readers not to treat Chiang Kai-shek’s words as “gospel”, to avoid bias against “so-called Communist China”, and to condemn the Kuomintang regime for its undemocratic nature, extreme brutality, and the like. Many other publications in Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles adopted a similar stance. Ultimately, the press shaped the outlook of both political elites and the general public.

Nevertheless, reports of successive victories by communist forces in the Chinese civil conflict began to alarm American newspaper magnates – men who, like many in political circles, were already deeply concerned about post-war political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world. The logic of the nascent Cold War was beginning to prevail. While Foreign Affairs magazine had maintained a rather restrained tone when discussing the growing role and significance of the CCP, perhaps the first signal of a shift in the stance of leading US publications regarding the “China question” was an article by William Bullitt – a high-ranking diplomat and prominent American statesman—titled “Report to the American People on China”, which appeared in Life magazine on October 13, 1947. The article argued that a communist victory in China would place the country under Soviet control, thereby posing a “mortal danger” to the United States. It accused the late President Franklin Roosevelt, along with former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of having “sacrificed vital US interests in China to the Soviet Union”.

American researcher H. Westerfield believed that W. Bullitt’s article was instigated by Henry Luce, the head of the major publishing conglomerate Time-Life and a man known for his staunch right-wing conservative views. He assessed the publisher’s role in the anti-China campaign that unfolded in the United States in the late 1940s as follows: “H. Luce, undoubtedly driven by his family’s long-standing ties to China as well as by anti-communism, placed his newspaper empire at the forefront of the movement supporting Nationalist China. His influence within Republican Party circles – particularly in the Northeast – was significant… China was a sensational anti-communist issue that the Republicans could use against H. Truman.”

Other media outlets linked to conservative circles within the American establishment soon joined the campaign defending Chiang Kai-shek, including Reader’s Digest, Plain Talk, China Monthly, and U.S. News & World Report. Through the press, anti-communist public forces focused Congress’s attention on the “China question” and brought the issue to the forefront of national debate. By the late 1940s, virtually the entire American press had shifted to an anti-China stance. The New York Times – which had only recently advocated for an objective and sober approach toward the Chinese Communists – by 1952 was, amidst the emerging Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the fierce war on the Korean Peninsula, unsparingly vilifying the People’s Republic of China and those within the U.S. government and public sphere who had allegedly “facilitated” the “enemy’s” victory and “rejoiced” at the American defeat. The newspaper characterized the Truman administration’s policy on the “China question” as “one of the blackest pages in the history of American diplomacy”. Many other periodicals were equally, if not more, categorical in their conclusions that China was lost to the U.S. and that high-ranking officials in Washington were to blame. American journalists portrayed the PRC as an aggressor seeking to carry out a “global conspiracy to “communize the world”” and as a mortal enemy of the United States.

Alongside the military-political and economic considerations of the early Cold War years, a significant factor in turning American public opinion against the new China was the fact that Americans felt no sense of guilt toward the Chinese people; on the contrary, they viewed all U.S. activities in East Asia – and in China specifically – as noble and humane. Consequently, the rift between revolutionary China and the United States – and, even more so, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement – was widely perceived in the U.S. as a betrayal and proof of the Chinese people’s “callous ingratitude”. This sense of grievance against the Chinese was further exacerbated by the outbreak of the Korean conflict and continued to color the U.S. stance on the “China question” throughout the 1950s. Through both print media and the rapidly expanding medium of television, negative stereotypes regarding all things Chinese – ranging from the policies of the PRC leadership to the national character of the Chinese people – became entrenched in the American consciousness. Conversely, the positive attitude toward Taiwan – also driven primarily by U.S. economic and military-political interests in the Asia-Pacific region – was reinforced by a sense of moral satisfaction that Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters had proven to be “grateful” Chinese. It is worth noting that the author’s research failed to uncover a single critical article regarding the establishment of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan; this absence allows for certain conclusions about the prevailing views found in leading American publications at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s.

Thus, the perception of China in the American press during the first half of the 20th century was not static; it underwent a significant evolution directly shaped by developments on the international stage and the internal political situation in China. The American press played a prominent role in shaping the public image of China – first as a victim of Japanese aggression and later as an ally. However, this image was largely mythologized and oversimplified. In the early postwar years – marked by the resumption of the Chinese Civil War, the communist victory, and China’s subsequent entry into the Korean War as a US adversary – this led to profound disillusionment and the emergence of a new, intensely hostile narrative that defined the rhetoric of the early Cold War era, right up until the US-China rapprochement of the 1970s.